Federal Judicial Review Jurisdiction under the Federal Court Act: when is a  federal board, commission or other tribunal  not a  federal board, commission or tribunal ? by Macdonald, R. A.
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 6 Issue 3 Article 2 
5-1-1981 
Federal Judicial Review Jurisdiction under the Federal Court Act: 
when is a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" not a 
"federal board, commission or tribunal"? 
R. A. Macdonald 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
R. A. Macdonald, “Federal Judicial Review Jurisdiction under the Federal Court Act: when is a "federal 
board, commission or other tribunal" not a "federal board, commission or tribunal"?” (1980-1981) 6:3 DLJ 
449. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
R. A. Macdonald* Federal Judicial Review
Jurisdiction under the Federal
Court Act: when is a "federal
board, commission or other
tribunal" not a "federal board,
commission or tribunal"?
I. Introduction
The precise scope of the judicial review jurisdiction of the Federal
Court has always been a matter of some doubt and controversy.'
Over the past decade problems have arisen with respect to federal
reviewability of decisions of the Governor-in-Council, 2 of section
96 judges, 3 of Canadian Crown corporations, 4 of various officials in
the North-West Territories, 5 and of decision-makers acting pursuant
to the federal power over Indians. 6 In many of these cases,
seemingly conflicting judicial decisions as to the effect of section
2(g) of the Federal Court Act 7 have been rendered: sometimes
*R. A Macdonald, of the Faculty of Law, McGill University. I would like to thank
my colleague Prof. S. A. Scott for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft
on this essay. Of course any errors remaining are solely the responsibility of the
author.
I. See Mullan, The Federal Court Act (1977), at 17-22 and footnotes therein. See
also Pepin and Ouellette, Principes de contentieux administratif (1979), at 287-291;
Reid and David, Administrative Law and Practice (2nd ed.) (1978), at 474-475;
Kavanaugh, A Guide to Judicial Review (1978), at 124-129; Mullan,
Administrative Law (2nd ed.) (1979), at 262-265; Macdonald, "Federal Judicial
Review Jurisdiction under Section 2(g) of the Federal Court Act: the Position of
Section 96 judges" (1979), 11 Ott. L. R. 689; Mullan, "History and Constitutional
Basis of the Federal Court of Canada" in Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Special Commission of Inquiry Into Jurisdiction of Federal Court (undated)
2. Re Clark et al. and A.-G. Canada (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 593 (H.C.); Inuit
Tapirisat of Canada and the National Anti-Poverty Organization v. The
Governor-in-Cojncil (1979), 24 N.R. 361 (F.CA.)
3. A. G. Canada v. Morrow, [1973] F.C. 889 (T.D.); Herman v. A. G. Canada
(1978), 22 N.R. 235 (S.C.C.)
4. Canada Metal Co. Ltd. v. C.B.C. (1975), 11 O.R. (2d) 167 (H.C.);Joyal v.
Air Canada, [1976] C.S. 1211;Bourgault v. C.M.H.C., [1978] C.S. 501
5. Re Forter Arctic Ltd. and Liquor Control Board of N.W.T. (1971), 21 D.L.R.
(3d) 619 (N.W.T.S.C.); Re Pfeiffer and Commis. of N.W.T. (1977), 75 D.L.R.
(3d) 407 (N.W.T.S.C.)
6. Lavell v. A. G. Canada, [1971] F.C. 347 (C.A.);A.-G. Can v. Canard, [1976]
I S.C.R. 170; Gabriel v. Canatonguin, [1978] 1 F.C. 124 (T. D.)
7. R. S. C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10. The expression S. 2(g) is used for
convenience to refer to the unnumbered definition of "federal board, commission
or other tribunal" contained in section 2 of the Act.
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courts have been uncertain as to the meaning of the attributive
phrase "jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of the
Parliament of Canada"; sometimes they have been troubled by the
limiting clause "other than . . . any such person or persons
appointed . . . under section 96 of the British North America Act,
1867". Moreover, the full effect of section 101 of the B.N.A. Act
on the judicial review jurisdiction of the Court has yet to be
established. 8 Finally, in several decisions, judges have questioned
whether the Federal Court indeed has exclusive jurisdiction where
an issue of constitutional division of powers is raised.9
Nevertheless, until recently courts appear to have experienced
much less difficulty in interpreting that part of the exclusionary
provisions of section 2(g) of the Federal Court Act which states
"other than any such body constituted or established by or under a
law of a province or any such person or persons appointed under or
in accordance with a law of a province". In fact, the meaning of the
clause has rarely been discussed in detail in a reported judgment. 10
Both federal and provincial courts consistently have found, in cases
of federal inter-delegation, that the determination of whether a body
is "constituted or established by or under a law of a province"
depends primarily on the true construction of the Parliamentary
legislation by which federal jurisdiction or powers are granted. If
the federal statute actually creates a federal body (even though its
members perform analogous functions under provincial law) or
expressly appoints an individual to a federal office (even though he
holds a similar office by virtue of provincial law) judicial review
will lie in the Federal Court. 1 If, however, the federal statute
8. For a narrow reading of the expression "Laws of Canada" in s. 101 see Quebec
N. Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S. C. R. 1054 and Hogg,
Comment, (1977), 55 Can. Bar Rev. 550. If this decision is taken to its letter, it
might mean that the part of section 2(g) which states "or purporting to exercise"
jurisdiction is unconstitutional as conferring powers on the Federal Court to hear
matters not arising from "some existing Federal Law". See infra text following
note 60 for a discussion of this point.
9. Hamilton v. Hamilton Harbour Commissioners, [1972] 3 O.R. 61 (H.C.) and
Gibson, Comment, (1976), 54 Can. Bar. Rev. 372; see also Law Society of B.C. v.
A.-G. Canada (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 53 (B.C.S.C.)
10. Of the approximately thirty reported decisions where this particular aspect of
the section 2(g) definition was directly raised as an issue, only the C.P. Transport,
[1976] 5 W.W.R. 541 (Sask. C.A.) case deals with the point in any detail,
although Walker v. Gagnon, [1976] 2 F.C. 155 (T.D.), Lingley v. Hickman,
[1972] F.C. 171 (T.D.) and Vardy v. Scott (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431 (S.C.C.)
also raise the question in passing. See further the brief discussion inLavell v. A.-G.
Canada (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 505
11. For examples of provincial appointees exercising federal powers who are also
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merely delegates federal powers to a person appointed, or a body
established under a provincial law, review will lie in the appropriate
provincial Superior Court. 12 Hence, regardless of whatever other
provincial statutory role, function or office the recipient of a power
delegated by a federal statute might perform, the locus of judicial
review when he exercises federal powers must be determined upon a
true construction of the federal enactment. 
13
While such an approach to the exclusionary terms of section 2(g)
may be relatively easy to state in the abstract, at least two recent
cases seem to illustrate that even this heretofore more tranquil
aspect of the definition of "federal board, commission or other
tribunal" is capable of generating difficulties in interpretation. In
early 1976, the meaning of the second arm of the exclusionary
clause (i.e. other than a person or persons appointed under or in
accordance with a law of a province) came directly before the
Supreme Court for the first time.14 In three short paragraphs at the
end of his judgment, Dickson, J. held that a provincial Magistrate
taking depositions under the Extradition Act 15 performed a simple
administrative task under the Act which was not "integral to the
comprehensive extradition scheme created by statute and treaty".
He concluded:
The Magistrate, appointed under a law of a Province and
exercising only peripheral powers when the Extradition Act,
analogous to his usual judicial duties, remains subject to the
supervisory jurisdiction of provincial Superior Courts. 16
In other words, with respect to persons who may exercise delegated
held to be expressly appointed by Federal legislation (and therefore subject to
Federal Court review), see Walker v. Gagnon, [1976] 2 F.C. 155 (T.D.), and
Martoinffv. Gossen, [1979] 1 F.C. 327 (T.D.).
12. Cases where provincial boards exercising federal powers have been held not be
constituted as federal boards include: C.P. Transport v. Highway Transport Board,
[1976] 5. W.W.R. 541 (Sask. C.A.); Re Bicknell Freighters Ltd. (1977), 77
D.L.R. (3d) 417 (Man. C.A.); National Freight Consultants Inc. v. Motor
Transport Board (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 504 (Alat. S.C.T.D.), (1979), 96 D.L.R.
(3d) 278 (Alta. S.C.A.D.); Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act (1978), 84
D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
13. Contrast the decisions in Vardy v. Scott (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431 (S.C.C.)
and Johnston v. A.-G. Can., [1977] 2 F.C. 301 (T.D.) See also the comment on the
former case by Fera, (1977), 3 Queen's L.J. 183
14. Vardy v. Scott (1976) 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431 (S.C.C.). Since this decision has
already been the subject of a comment, supra note 13, its facts will not be reviewed
in detail here.
15. R.S.C. 1970, c. E-21
16. Supra, note 14 at 443
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federal powers, the Court seemed to rely on the general concept of
persona designata as a criterion for determining when such an
individual exercises these powers in a capacity distinct from his
day-to-day functions as a provincial appointee. It follows from this
view that when one contemplates whether a provincial appointee is
or is not nominated as a persona designata under a federal statute
reference also must be had to the provincial Act in order to
determine what are the normal or usual functions of that
appointee. 17 In this respect, the judgment of Dickson, J represents
an important qualification in the judicial approach to the second
exclusionary term of section 2(g).
The more significant exclusion set out in the Act (i.e. other than a
body constituted or established by or under a law of a province) has
not yet been the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, a recent decision of the Ontario Divisional Court18 on
this point seems to overrule established Federal Court
jurisprudence' 9 and also puts into doubt the accepted methodology
for evaluating when a nominally provincial body has been
constituted as a federal tribunal exercising federal powers. This
decision, Re Abel and Penetang Mental Health Centre is of
particular importance because it strikes at the heart of federal
judicial review jurisdiction in all matters involving inter-delegation
to administrative agencies. If followed, it would seem to oblige the
Federal Parliament to revise radically its approach to inter-
delegation whenever it wishes to vest review of federal powers so
delegated in the Federal Court. 20
The situation confronting the Court in Re Abel was not novel;
nor, at first blush did it appear to be particularly difficult to resolve.
A number of persons held at the Penetanguishine Mental Health
Centre, Oak Ridge Division, pursuant to warrants of the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Ontario issued under ss.
17. For a discussion of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the persona
designata question see Macdonald, supra, note I
18. Re Abel and Penetang Mental Health Centre et al. (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 279
(Div. Ct.)
19. Lingley v. Hickman, [1972] F.C. 171 (T.D.); Re Lingley and N.B. Board of
Review (1975), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 81 (F.C.T.D.)
20. An indication of the need for such revision can be seen in the judgment in Re
Shoal Lake Band of Indians and the Queen (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 132 (Ont.
H.C.) where, in a case of inter-delegation with respect to fisheries, the issue of the
proper forum was not even raised, even though a strong case for Federal Court
jurisdiction can be made out.
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545 and 546 of the Criminal Code,21 sought various declaratory
orders from the Ontario Divisional Court. These orders were to be
directed primarily against a tribunal styled as the "Advisory Review
Board". 22 In substance it was argued that various decisions of the
Board were void as being taken in violation of the principles of
natural justice. 23 The application of relief came before Grange,
Southey and O'Driscoll, JJ., the first two of whom delivered
judgement in favour of the applicants and ordered the decision of
the Advisory Review Board quashed. In a dissenting opinion,
O'Driscoll, J. stated not only that he would have refused relief on
the merits of the application, but also that the Divisional Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the application. According to Mr. Justice
O'Driscoll, the Advisory Review Board was a "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" whose determinations would be
subject to judicial review only in the Federal Court.2 4 This latter
contention was expressly rejected by Mr. Justice Grange in what
appears to be an addendum to his judgment. He noted:
The Board is an emanation of the Province having been set up
under the Mental Health Act. It may be that the enactment of s.
547 of the Criminal Code has rendered unconstitutional or
inoperative s. 31 of the Mental Health Act but that question was
neither raised nor argued before us. In my view, however, the
enactment of the Criminal Code section would not transform a
provincial board into a federal board. It could only put it out of
21. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 as amended
22. Supra, note 18, at 282. The applicants also sought declaratory relief against
the Penetang Mental Health Centre in an application not relevant to the present
discussion.
23. See id. The applicants sought:
(a) An Order in the nature of a declaration declaring that the Advisory
Review Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), while conducting a
hearing pursuant to Sections 31 and 29 of the Mental Health Act R.S.O.
1970, c. 269, is subject to the provisions of the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act, 1971 and the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971; and
subject to the provisions of Sections 545 and 547 of the Criminal Code
(Canada).
(b) An Order in the nature of certiorari quashing the decision of the Board
denying the applicants or their legal or medical appointees disclosure of
any information that had been or was intended to be made available to the
Advisory Review Board for the purpose of being taken into consideration
by the Board in reaching its decision...
(c) an Order in the nature of a declaration declaring that the decision of the
Board denying the Applicants or their medical or legal appointees such
disclosure. . . constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice.
24. Id., at 286-287
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existence. 25
For Mr. Justice Grange, therefore, the question of whether a
nominally provincial Board is or is not appointed by or under a law
of a province when it exercises federal powers apparently may be
answered by determining if the provincial board predates the federal
statute under which powers are delegated. This decision also
appears to represent a significant shift in the judicial approach to the
exclusionary provisions of section 2(g).
Unfortunately in neither Vardy v. Scott nor Re Abel do the
judgments contain a detailed analysis of the inclusive and
exclusionary clauses of section 2(g).2 6 Yet because the Federal
Court has previously held certain provincial appointees and an
Advisory Review Board of another province to be federal boards,
commissions or other tribunals these decisions offer an excellent
opportunity to canvass thoroughly the effect of the section 2(g)
definition on various instances of federal inter-delegation. Specifi-
cally, they invite commentary on the criteria (including constitu-
tional principles) to be used in determining when a federal statute
which apparently delegates powef to a provincial tribunal, actually
creates a separate federal body to exercise this federal jurisdiction.
2 7
Such an investigation necessarily has two aspects: (i) what is the
meaning of the inclusive clause "any body . . . having, exercising
or purporting to exercise jursidiction or powers conferred by or
under an Act of the Parliament of Canada"? and (ii) what is the
meaning of the exclusionary clause "other than any such body
constituted or established by or under a law of a province"? For it is
only by analysing separately each of these terms of the section 2(g)
definition that a correct approach to federal jurisdiction may be
elaborated, and the relationship between federal constitutional
jurisdiction under section 91 and Federal Court judicial review
jurisdiction under section 2(g) may be clarified.
II. Bodies excercising jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under
an Act of the Parliament of Canada
Within the general realm of the topic known as administrative law
25. Id., at 296
26. In Vardy v. Scott, Dickson, J. discusses the point in three paragraphs; in Re
Abel O'Driscoll, J. and Grange, J. each devote only one paragraph to this issue.
27. For the converse situation, a provincial statute which delegates powers to a
federal board, see President de la Commission d'appel des Pensions v. Matte,
[1974] C.A. 252.
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three distinct sources of decisional power usually have been
identified: statute, royal prerogative and contract. 28 Hence, if one
were to consider the Federal Court as indeed the appropriate
jurisdiction for reviewing the exercise of all federal administrative
law powers, one would expect its jurisdiction to be stated so as to
encompass the decisions of any person or body exercising
jurisdiction conferred by one of these sources. In other words, under
such a view, the section 2(g) definition of "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" (upon which judicial review
jurisdiction under both sections 18 and 28 depends) should envision
any body or decision-maker exercising section 91 powers or
jurisdiction conferred (i) by or under an Act of Parliament, (ii) by or
under the federal Royal Prerogative, and (iii) by or under any other
enactment, prerogative or source (e.g. contract) 29 within a federally
regulated domain. 30 But the language of section 2(g) of the Federal
Court Act is not so comprehensive; "federal board, commission or
other tribunal" is rather narrowly defined as
any body or any person having, exercising or purporting to
exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of
the Parliament of Canada ... 31
Consequently, even at its widest (i.e. without taking into account
the several exclusionary phrases of section 2(g) of the Act) Federal
Court judicial review jurisdiction would appear not to extend to all
administrative law powers in the federal domain, but rather, would
seem restricted to persons or bodies exercising powers derived from
a Parliamentary enactment.
3 2
28. See Molot. "Annual Survey of Administrative Law" (1975), 7 Ott. L.R. 514
at 515-517. This list is not exhaustive. See infra, text accompanying notes 40-46
29. Provided of course that such powers were of a public or quasi-public nature.
See Re O.P.P. Assoc. Inc. et al. and The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario
(1974), 3. O.R. (2d) 698 (Div. Ct.)
30. In view of the justifications advanced at the time the Federal Court Act was
passed, one would think that comprehensive federal judicial review jurisdiction
was indeed intended to be vested in the Court. See, for example, Chalmers, "The
Federal Court Act as an Attempt to solve some Problems of Administrative Law in
the Federal Area" (1972), 18 McGill L.J. 206. Nevertheless, the subsequent
attitude of Courts (see Re Clark et al (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 593 (H.C.); Herman v.
A.-G. Canada (1978), 23 N.R. 235 (S.C.C.)) and commentators (see C.B.A.
Special Inquiry Into Jurisdiction of Federal Court (undated)) reflects an opposite
perspective. Here, of course, one is concerned only with what jurisdiction actually
was conferred by the Federal Court Act.
31. R.S.C. 1970, (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 2
32. This is not to claim that Federal Court jurisdiction may not be more extensive
in other areas or under other sections of the Act. See infra, 39
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Since the Federal Court Act came into force in 1971 a relatively
consistent jurisprudence has adhered to the precise terms of section
2(g) and has refused to permit judicial control of federal prerogative
powers under either sections 18 or 28. 33 In practice, it will be
almost invariably the Governor-in-Council who exercises federal
prerogative powers in such a way as to give rise to an application for
judicial review, 34 although it is not inconceivable that certain other
persons or bodies may be exercising delegated prerogative
powers. 35 However, simply because the Governor-in-Council is the
appropriate party respondent in judicial review proceedings does not
of itself mean that prerogative powers are in issue: such jurisdiction
may be conferred upon the Governor-in-Council by or under an Act
of Parliament. In this latter case, there is every reason for
concluding that the Governor-in-Council is a "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" and hence, in principle, susceptible
to Federal Court review. 36 For example, in Inuit Tapirisat et al. v.
Governor-in-Councl, 37 the Governor-in-Council acting under s. 64
of the National Transportation Act, 3 8 constituted a "federal board,
commission or other tribunal". Moreover, on many occasions
declaratory orders have been granted with respect to regulations
made by the Governor-in-Council. 39  Nevertheless, if the
Governor-in-Council indeed acts as the Crown (i.e. exercises Royal
Prerogative jurisdiction) his acts will not be subject to judicial
review under section 18 or section 28.40 Furthermore, insofar as any
33. See for example, M.N.R. v. Creative Shoes (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 89
(F.C.A.);S.E.A.P. v.A.E.C.B. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 541 (F.C.A.)
34. Under sections 12 and 15 of the B.N.A. Act it is however possible for the
Governor-General alone, or the Queen herself to exercise such powers.
35. Such a situation could arise in situations such as Ex parte Lain, [ 19671 2 Q.B.
864 or Re Raney et al and The Queen in Right of Ontario (1974), 4 O.R. (2d) 249
(C.A.) or in any case involving a true Royal Commission (i.e. a Commission not
acting by virtue of the Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-13). Finally such delegation
could be possible under the provisions of section 14 of the B.N.A. Act.
36. This does not mean that review of decisions of the Governor-in-Council may
be sought under section 28. See section 28(6) which expressly precludes review of
"a decision or order of the Governor-in-Council. . .". Insofar as other prerogative
decision-makers are concerned the requirement that a duty to act judicially be
imposed "by law" would seem to exclude section 28 review.
37. (1978), 24 N.R. 361 (F.C.A.) Cf. Desjardins v. Bouchard (1976), 71 D.L.R.
(3d) 491 (F.C.T.D.)
38. 1970R.S.C.,c. N-17
39. The Queen v. Robertson, [1972] F.C. 796 (C.A.); Ulin v. The Queen, [1973]
F.C. 319 (T.D.)
40. Some early cases seem to countenance the possibility of declaratory
proceedings being sought against the Crown. See, for example, Smith v. The
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other person or body, however appointed, constituted or estab-
lished, purports to exercise jurisdiction conferred by or under the
federal Royal Prerogative, no application to review the exercise of
such power would lie in the Federal Court under sections 18 or 28.41
But decision-making powers of a public or quasi-public nature at
the federal level do not arise only under an Act of Parliament or
under federal Royal Prerogative. There are a number of persons or
tribunals whose jurisdiction may be considered to be derived at least
in part from contract. For example, one may cite the case of
arbitrators or arbitration boards acting pursuant to a collective
agreement signed under the Canada Labour Code.42 While review
of even truly consensual arbitrators at the provincial level has been
held to fall within the terms of the Ontario Judicial Review
Procedure Act, 4" since the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Association of Radio and T.V. Employees v. C.B.C. 
44 it
has been accepted that at the federal level, these quasi-consensual
bodies do not fall within the terms of section 2(g). The Supreme
Court held, per Laskin, C.J.C., that
the bare direction for a provision for final settlement of all
differences as to the meaning or violation of the terms of a
collective agreement . . . [cannot bring]. . . any instrument for
such settlement, be it a board of arbitration as in this case or some
other agency, within the category of the public tribunals which
are envisaged by the definition in s. 2(g).45
Thus, even though various powers to resolve disputes were
conferred under an Act of Parliament, the fact that the parties
Queen,[1972] F.C. 561 (T.D.); Landreville v. The Queen, [1973] F.C. 1223
tT.D.). How-1oever, it is probably more correct to see these as instances of an action
against the Crown under section 17 of the Federal Court Act rather than as
applications for declaratory relief under section 18. On the scope of relief against
the Governor-in-Council and the Queen see Re Clark and A.-G. Canada (1977), 17
O.R. (2d) 593 (H.C.), and Macdonald "Comment" (1978), 10 Ott. L.R. 456.
41. A curious example of a situation where this conclusion would be significant
arises in respect of institutions established under Royal Charter. The Royal
Institution for the Advancement of Learning (McGill University) is one such body.
Constituted under a pre-Confederation Royal Charter, the visitorial jurisdiction in
the University is vested in the Governor General. Since neither the administrative
officers of the University, nor the Governor General exercises powers under a law
of Canada, review of the decisions of each (to the extent such decisions are
judicially reviewable) would remain vested in the Superior Court of Quebec.
42. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1
43. S.O. 1971, c. 48. See supra note 28
44. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 118
45. Id. at 121
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themselves selected the mode of settlement made the exercise of
such powers so remote from the statute itself that jurisdiction could
not really said to be founded in an Act of Parliament. 46 Hence,
review would not lie in the Federal Court.
A second type of situation where Federal power does not arise
either under an Act of Parliament or under federal prerogative can
be traced to the constitutional structure of Canadian government.
There are today still some institutions exercising federal powers
granted by an Imperial Statute, most notably the B.N.A. Act.
Among persons or bodies vested with such powers one may cite the
Queen's Privy Councillors for Canada. Consequently any decisions
made by the Privy Council under the B.N.A. Act (e.g. in advising
the Governor-General) would not be subject to review in the Federal
Court.47 Again, education appeals to the Governor-in-Council under
section 93(3) of the B.N.A. Act are an example of a federal power
arising other than by statute or prerogative. Finally, in the case that
it might arise, appointees of the Governor-in-Council under section
131 of the B.N.A. Act, who exercise powers to carry out the
provisions of the Act would also be exempt from federal review.
A third example of federal power conferred by a mechanism
which might not attract federal review under section 2(g) involves
persons or bodies exercising powers flowing from a treaty entered
into by the Federal government. Although invariably treaties
concluded by the Government of Canada are incorporated and
ratified by Parliamentary legislation it is arguable that certain
decisions taken by tribunals or bodies pursuant to powers set out in
such treaties are too remote from federal legislation to constitute
decision by or under an Act of the Parliament of Canada. Such
circumstances are, in practice, apt to be extremely rare.
48
In view of the above observations one might conclude that only
46. Since the C.B.C. case the Canada Labour Code has been amended to vest
review jurisdiction expressly in Provincial Courts. For a recent example of such
power see Rankin v. National Harbours Board (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 631
(B.C.S.C.)
47. Furthermore, proceedings in quo warranto against a Privy Councillor as such
could not be taken in the Federal Court. For an example of such a case see The King
v. Speyer, [1916]2 K.B. 858
48. In such a case it would be necessary to envision a tribunal established by treaty
whose jurisdiction arises by consent of affected parties (e.g. on international
arbitration agreement). It is difficult to speculate in this area, although the decision
inLakerAirways Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 234 (C.A.) suggests that
various aspects Treaty-making powers may in the future come increasingly under
scrutiny by way of judicial review.
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those federal decision-makers whose powers are directly delegated
by a federal statute may be judicially reviewed in the Federal Court.
Even given this restriction, however, a literal reading of the phrase
"by or under an Act of Parliament" would establish a broad
jurisdiction, including in this category any body exercising
delegated statutory powers, whatever be their nature: not only
agencies, boards and commissions as those terms are popularly
understood, but "all persons deriving decision-making authority
from any Act of the Federal Parliament or subordinate legislation
made under such an Act". 49 Hence, minor immigration officials, 50
District Supervisors under the Indian Act, 51 penetentiary doctors,
52
harbour policemen, 53 the Liquor Control Board of the Northwest
Territories, 54 and officers of federal Crown corporations
55
presumably would be "federal boards, commissions or other
tribunals", since all exercise powers ultimately traceable to a
federal enactment. However, none have been held to fall under the
definition of section 2(g); in each case, the court concluded that the
official in question was not exercising jurisdiction under a federal
statute. 56 Moreover, in the ten year history of the Act no application
to review the decision of an officer of a federal corporation
49. Mullan,Administrative Law (2nd ed. 1979), s. 256
50. Re Russo andM.M.I. (1977), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 118 (F.C.T.D.)
51. Bedard v. Isaac et al, [197212 O.R. 391 (H.C.)
52. McNamara v. Caros, [1978] 1 F.C. 451 (T.D.)
53. Rogers v. NationalHarbours Board, [1979] 1 F.C. 90 (T.D.)
54. Re FortierArctic Ltd. (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 619 (N.W.T.S.C.)
55. Canada Metal Co. Ltd. v. C.B.C. (no. 2) (1975), 11 O.R. (2d) 167 (C.A.)
56. In Re Russo the court stated at page 121: "persons authorized only to
implement a decision made by a tribunal are not included in the definition ... [of
section 2." In Bedard, the court stated at page 395: "1 am not persuaded that the
term "federal board, commission or other tribunal" is sufficiently broad to
encompass an individual such as a District Supervisor under the Indian Act." In
McNamara the court stated at page 452: "the respondent Mendes, institutional
physician at Matsqui Institution, a penitentiary as described in the Penitentiary Act,
is not, when acting in his professional capacity in the treatment of inmates, a
"federal board, commission or other tribunal" as defined." In Rogers the court
stated at page 91: "the decision here under attack was not made by a "federal
board, commission or other tribunal" within the meaning of section 2 of the
Federal Court Act. That decision was pronounced by a police officer acting under
the provisions of the collective agreement." InRe FortierArctic the Court held that
the Liquor Control Board of the Northwest Territories was not a federal board
because section 28 of the federal Interpretation Act which provides that
"province" means . . . and includes . . . the Northwest Territories." Finally in
Canada Metal the court stated at pages 170-171: "the C.B.C. . . . [is] ... a
corporate entity carrying on the business of broadcasting in this country with none
of the attributes of a federal board, commission or tribunal."
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apparently has been brought, even though his authority to act is
derived from a federal statute, the Canadian Business Corporations
Act. 57 Finally, there is no reported case where an attempt has been
made to seek judicial review of a private citizen exercising powers
under a federal statute (e.g. arrest powers under section 449 of the
Criminal Code).58 In each of the above instances one can find an
example of powers being exercised which, according to the literal
terms of section 2(g), should be subject to judicial review in the
Federal Court. Yet each either has not or likely would not be held to
fall under section 2(g). One may conclude that, notwithstanding the
apparently broad definition of "federal board, commission or other
tribunal" (at least insofar as persons deriving powers from an Act of
Parliament are concerned), Courts will limit its scope to persons or
bodies who would be viewed as administrative decision-makers
under an orthodox view of the expression. 59
57. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32. Other federal statutes which authorize corporate
decision making include the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-I; or the British and
Canadian Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-15. In A.-G. Canada v.
Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 Chief Justice Laskin suggests that implicit in section
2(g) is the requirement that decision-makers be exercising public functions. Since
the above was written the Alberta Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Sparling
v. Duby, (1980) 6 W.W.R. 97, finding no jurisdiction in the Federal Court.
58. In such cases a more appropriate remedy would be an action for false
imprisonment and on this basis courts are likely to refuse relief even though Federal
Court jurisdiction could be established.
59. The following quotation, from the judgment in Wilcox v. C.B.C. (1979), 101
D.L.R. (3d) 484 (F.C.T.D.) is representative of the judicial approach in this area.
At 487 the Court states:
While I see no reason to doubt that the powers referred to in the definition of
"federal board, commission or other tribunal" in s. 2 are not confined to
powers that are required by law to be exercised on a judicial or quasi-judicial
basis, it appears to me that the expression "jurisdiction or powers" refers to
jurisdiction or powers of a public character in respect of the exercise of which
procedures by prerogative writs or by injunction or declaratory relief would
formerly have been appropriate ways of invoking the supervisory authority of
the Superior Courts. I do not think it includes the private powers exercisable
by an ordinary corporation created under a federal statute which are merely
incidents of its legal personality or of the business it is authorized to operate.
Absurd and very inconvenient results would flow from an interpretation that it
does include such powers and it does not appear to me that that was intended
or that it is necessary to so interpret the expression in the context in which it is
used.
It appears to me, as well, that if the powers of the defendant under the
Broadcasting Act in respect of the defendant's broadcasting activities are not
powers of the kind embraced by the definition, there is even less reason to
conclude that the power of the defendant to engage employees falls within the
meaning of the definition.
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The discussion so far has revealed two limitations upon federal
jurisdiction: first, the definition in section 2(g) offers an incomplete
inventory of federal administrative decision-makers, and secondly,
courts have restricted the scope of the expression "conferred by or
under an Act of Parliament" to various officials exercising public
powers granted rather directly by a federal statute. But the ambit of
this definition is also limited by a third condition, the interpretation
placed on the expression "laws of Canada" by the Supreme Court
of Canada. Although section 2(g) is drafted so as to encompass all
persons "having, exercising or purporting to exercise powers" it is
now open to question whether Parliament has the authority to
establish jurisdiction in the Federal Court to hear applications taken
against individuals purporting to exercise powers conferred by an
Act of Parliament. If Parliament may vest in a section 101 court
only jurisdiction in respect of matters where there is "applicable
and existing federal law, whether under statute or regulation or
common law" 0 then the Federal Court cannot be given jurisdiction
whenever a federal tribunal's action formally exceeds its statutory
authority or whenever a body or persons usurp federal powers, or
whenever a federal tribunal is constituted under a constitutionally
ultra vires statute. In other words, it is a reasonable deduction
from the Quebec North Shore Paper case that unless a
decision-maker's powers actually result from a law of Canada
(which is manifestly not the case whenever he acts ultra vires),
Federal Court jurisdiction upon judicial review should be excluded.
Such a result would indeed sterilize judicial review in the Federal
Court and consequently one would not expect the Supreme Court to
read its decision in Quebec North Shore Paper literally. Rather, one
might suggest that the Court will find to exist a "law of Canada"
sufficient to support a judicial review application in the Federal
Court until such time as it declares such law not to exist in a given
case.
61
I am accordingly of the opinion that the Court does not have jurisdiction under
s. 18 to entertain the plaintiff's claim and, as the Court has no general
common law or equity jurisdiction but has only such jurisdiction to administer
federal law as has been conferred on it by statute, there is, as well, no
jurisdiction to entertain an ordinary proceeding between subject and subject
for the declaratory relief which the plaintiff seeks.
60. Quebec North Shore Paper Co. et al v. C.P. Ltd. (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) I 11
at 120
61. Although the decision antedates Quebec North Shore, this seems to be the
rationale sustaining Federal Court jurisdiction in Re Steve Dart Co. and D.J. Duer
& Co. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 745, (F.C.T.D.) commented on by Fera, (1977), 23
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It follows from the above analysis that the scope of federal
judicial review jurisdiction is far from coextensive with federal
constitutional powers. Rather, at the outset, it is circumscribed by a
mixture of definitional lacunae (the omission of non-statutory
sources of power), restrictive judicial interpretation (the exclusion
of various statutory decision-makers whose powers seem remote
from the constituent legislation or not sufficiently public in
character), and over-riding constitutional issues (the scope of
jurisdiction which may be granted to a section 101 court). But,
despite these express and implied limitations on the scope of section
2(g) there is little doubt that both the Magistrate in Vardy v. Scott
and the Advisory Review Board in Re Abel were exercising
"powers or jurisdiction conferred by or under an Act of the
Parliament of Canada". In Vardy these powers were granted by
section 31 of the Extradition Act, while in Re Abel these were set
out in sections 547(5) through (7) of the Criminal Code. Therefore,
in either of these cases, if judicial review jurisdiction is to be found
in provincial superior courts (as it was), such jurisdiction must
result from the fact that one of the exceptions set out in section 2(g)
of the Federal Court Act is found to apply.
III. Other than any such body constituted or established by or
under a law of a province or any such person or persons appointed
under or in accordance with a law of a province...
The definition of section 2(g) makes it apparent that even if a person
or body is found to be exercising federal powers, review under the
Federal Court Act may be excluded if the appointment of an
individual or the establishment of the body can be traced to a law of
a province. Consequently, in each case where a person or body
exercises federal powers, one must also ask by what title he
exercises these powers. In order to divine the precise situations in
which a power-holder will be held to fall within a section 2(g)
exception, it is necessary to distinguish various mechanisms by
which the delegates of federal power may be appointed.
McGill L.J. 677. One might also attempt to justify federal jurisdiction by
distinguishing acts from omissions: an ultra vires act constitutes an omission to do
what is mandated by statute. Hence, a reviewing court would find jurisdiction by
claiming that "administration of the laws of Canada" includes making
determinations that a negative statutory duty was not performed. Again, this
disingenous attempt to establish Federal Court jurisdiction should be not be
adopted.
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Presumably, the same three sources of provincial appointment
may exist as sources of federal power: provincial statute, provincial
prerogative, and other (including contract). With respect to
individuals appointed by virtue of provincial royal prerogative to
whom federal statutory powers are granted, the locus of judicial
review is not difficult to trace. Such persons or bodies (i.e. true
Royal Commissions appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of a
province),62 if vested with federal statutory powers, would be
subject to review in the Federal Court whenever exercising these
federal powers. Insofar as persons or bodies falling within the third
category of appointment are concerned, a similar conclusion must
be reached. Thus, any federal statutory powers delegated to a
Lieutenant-Governor would be reviewable in the Federal Court, as
this office is neither constituted nor established under a "law of a
province", but rather under the B.N.A. Act. 6 3 Again, in situations
where a federal statute delegates powers to a consensual tribunal
(e.g. an arbitrator) review would also lie in the Federal Court.
6 4
Hence, adjudicators under The Public Service Staff Relations Act 65
(exercising powers under an Act of Parliament because arbitration is
obligatory: nominated by the parties themselves) would be subject
to federal review. Finally, review of any body exercising federal
powers, whose source of appointment is non-governmental or for
which it is difficult to determine precisely who is the constituting
authority, would be vested in the Federal Court.66
The remaining category of individual or body is that involving
situations where federal statutory power is delegated to a person or
persons who are already appointed or constituted to perform various
statutory functions by a provincial law. As noted, the characteriza-
tion process in such cases must proceed first with an analysis of the
federal legislation. On the one hand, if the federal Act purports to
62. Possibly also included in the category of prerogative appointments would be
provincial Official Guardians. SeeReKnoch (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 312 (H.C.)
63. Thus, the power of a Lieutenant-Governor to appoint an advisory review board
under section 547 of the Criminal Code would be reviewable only in the Federal
Court. See Lingley v. Hickman, [1972] F.C. 171(T.D.)
64. Although the decision inJacmain v. A.-G. Canada (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 1
(S.C.C.) involved an appeal, if review were taken upon a non-appealable point
(n.b. section 29, Federal Court Act) review would be sought in the Federal Court.
65. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35
66. A paradigm example of such a body would be the "therapeutic abortion
committee" envisaged by section 251 of the Criminal Code. Although this
committee exercises federal statutory powers, it is difficult to establish precisely
how, or by virtue of what power it is established or constituted.
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create a new office to exercise federal powers (e.g. a Firearms
Registrar) even though the office may be filled by an individual
holding a provincial appointment in a similar domain (e.g. a police
constable) persons holding that office will be deemed to be federally
appointed. 67 On the other hand, if the federal statute merely
delegates powers to a named provincial appointee (e.g. a deputy
Crown Attorney) further analysis seems to be required.6 8 In order to
determine by whom such an individual is appointed it seems to be
necessary to have recourse to the concept of persona designata:
69 if
the delegate is performing functions having nothing to do with his
regular provincial duties he will be considered to be a federal
appointee persona designata; if his federal powers are only
tangential to the scheme of the federal statute and are analogous to
his day-to-day provincial duties he will be considered as appointed
under a law of a province. 70
A similar analysis should avail in the case of bodies already
constituted or established under a law of a province. If the federal
legislation purports to create a distinct federal board to exercise
federal powers, even though a similarly constituted provincial body
may be in existence, the board so established will be subject to
review only in the Federal Court. If the federal Act simply delegates
powers to an existing provincially-appointed body further analysis
must be undertaken into whether the concept of persona designata
may apply. However, given the current judicial approach to this
concept it is unlikely that a provincially-appointed board to whom
federal powers are directly delegated would ever be held to be
acting persona designata as a federal board.
71
It follows therefore, that apart from instances where the persona
designata issue arises, the key questions for determining federal
jurisdiction are "when will a person appointed under a law of a
67. Walker v. Gagnon, [1976) 2 F.C. 155 (T.D.);Martinoff v. Gossen, [1979] 1
F.C. (T.D.)
68. See Johnston v. A.-G. Canada , [1977] 2 F.C. 301 (T.D.). But compare Re
Shoal Lake Band of Indians and The Queen (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 132 (Ont.
H.C.) where the potential jurisdictional question was not even addressed.
69. See Vardy v. Scott (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431 (S.C.C.)
70. This test for determining when an official acts persona designata was
elaborated by the Supreme Court in Herman v. A.-G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R.
729. For a critique of this decision see Macdonald, supra, note 1
71. See the Transport Board cases, supra, note 12. In order for the board to be
found to be acting as a persona designata under the current test one would have to
imagine a situation such as the provincial Transport Board exercising powers under
the federal Agricultural Products Marketing Act.
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province be held not to be so appointed when exercising federal
powers?" and "when will a collection of persons or a body
established under a law of a province be held not to be so constituted
when exercising federal powers?" Insofar as individuals are
concerned, this question is relatively easy to answer; one need only
inquire if a power of appointment is set out in the federal Act. For
example, section 81(l) of the Criminal Code states that a local
Registrar of firearms means "a person appointed in writing by the
Commissioner or by the Attorney-General of a province",72 a clear
appointment under a federal statute. The more difficult hypothesis
involves bodies having an existence as provincial tribunals to whom
federal powers are granted. Since this issue has arisen in the past
with respect to Motor Transport Boards under the Motor Vehicle
Transport Act 73 and with Advisory Review Boards under the
Criminal Code7 4 discussion may usefully follow a comparison of
these two federal enactments. Under the Motor Vehicle Transport
Act the delegation of federal power is expressed in sections 2, 3(2)
and 4.
Section 2 defines "provincial transport board" as:
a board, commission or other body or person having under the
law of a province, authority to control or regulate the operation of
a local undertaking.
Section 3(2) provides:
The provincial transport board in each province may in its
discretion issue a license...
Section 4 states:
... the tariffs and bills . . . may in the discretion of the
provincial transport board be determined and regulated by the
provincial transport board...
A careful reading of these sections demonstrates that the federal act
in no way c6nstitutes or establishes a separate Transport Board to
regulate extra-provincial matters. Rather the statute refers to the
provincial board by its generic title, sets out no rules governing the
manner of its creation or the manner of exercise of the powers
delegated, and delegates powers directly to that Board.
On the other hand, section 547 of the Criminal Code reveals an
entirely different approach to the delegation of federal powers. This
72. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 82
73. R.S.C. 1970, c. M-14
74. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34
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section provides:
547(1). The lieutenant-governor of a province may appoint a
board to review the case of every person in custody in a place in
that province by virtue of an order made pursuant to section 545
or subsection 546(1) or (2).
Sections 547(2) through (4) and 547(7) establish limitations on the
qualifications of members, enact rules as to quorum, provide for the
designation of a chairman and grant several procedural powers to
the chairman. These sections make it absolutely clear that a separate
board is being created for the express purpose of exercising the
powers delegated by subsections (5) and (6). 75 First, unlike the
situation envisioned by the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, here the
Criminal Code does not even mention an existing provincial body;
moreover, it stipulates how the Board is to be created and it
provides for certain procedural powers of the board when it
performs its task. In other words, while it is logical to conclude that
Provincial Transport Boards are formally established under a law of
a province, the above provisions of section 547 of the Criminal
Code indicate that Advisory Review Boards exercising powers
delegated by section 547 are constituted not under a law of a
province but under the Criminal Code. 
76
Yet in Re Abel Mr. Justice Grange was of the opposite opinion for
reasons relating specifically to the statutory framework of
interdelegation operative in the province of Ontario. Nevertheless,
his remarks may be extrapolated to most instances of federal
interdelegation. After noting that an analogous board was created by
the Ontario Mental Health Act 77 , and that prior to the enactment of
section 527A of the Criminal Code this provincial Board exercised
similar functions to those set out by the current section 547,78 he
concluded:
the enactment of the Criminal Code section could not transform a
75. These provisions were originally added to the Code as section 527A by S.C.
1968-69, c. 93, s. 69 at which time they were amended by S.C. 1974-75-76 c. 93,
s. 69 at which time they were renumbered as section 547, and subsections 2 and
5(b) were amended and section 5(f) and 7 added thereto.
76. It should be noted that the Lieutenant-Governor is empowered to appoint
members. Yet this power is itself a federal power and the lieutenant-governor is
himself reviewable in the Federal Court. Supra, note 60
77. R.S.O. 1970, c. 269
78. These provisions in the Mental Health Act were added by S.O. 1967, c. 51, s.
31 while section 527A of the Criminal Code was enacted by S.C. 1968-69, c. 38,
s.48.
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provincial board into a federal board. It could only put it out of
existence.
79
In other words, Grange, J. believed that if federal and provincial
legislation were in conflict the only possible result would be the
total abolition of the board created by provincial law. Since the
tasks performed by the previously constituted provincial board
continued to be undertaken under section 547 Grange, J. concluded
that the provincial board itself was continued and was subject to
review in the Divisional Court. 80 Moreover, he felt that the previous
Advisory Review Board decision, Lingley v. Hickman8' was
inapplicable in Ontario, as no provincial Board existed in New
Brunswick at the time the Criminal Code was amended.
These remarks of course raise several important issues in
constitutional law, including paramountcy. 8 2 However, both
O'Driscoll, J.33 and Grange, J.84 agreed that since no question of
the constitutionality of the Ontario legislation or of the A.R.B. was
raised, that question should not be addressed. While it may be that
ultimately the resolution of all the issues in dispute in Re Abel will
require the Court to pass on the constitutional validity of both the
provincial and federal legislation, and to determine the precise
domain within which each is operative, even without such an
investigation the Court should be able to arrive at a juridical
characterisation of the Advisory Review Board contemplated by
section 547 of the Criminal Code. To the extent that he did not
undertake such an exercise of characterisation, Grange, J. failed to
frame adequately the jurisdictional question raised in Re Abel. The
Criminal Code may indeed put the provincial board completely out
of existence; but it may also simply constitute a parallel federal
board for the purposes of exercising section 547 powers, whose
membership happens to be identical to the provincial board
exercising powers under the Mental Health Act. In either case
79. Supra, note 18, at 296
80. At page 289 of his judgment he states:
The ARB was created by Order in Council [O.C. 1486/77] pursuant to the
Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 289 .... The Criminal Code also has
provisions for the establishment of a board of review (see Criminal Code, s.
547 [am. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 71]. For substantially the same purpose...
Ontario has proceeded under the Mental Health Act.
81. [1972] F.C. 171. (T.D.)
82. See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), at 101-113
83. Supra, note 18 at 285
84. Id., at 289
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judicial review in the Federal Court of section 547 powers would be
indicated.
That two distinct Boards have been created can be seen by
comparing the language of section 31 of the Mental Health Act with
that of section 547 of the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code
merely requires the Lieutenant Governor to appoint an Advisory
Review Board; this has been done ipso facto by the appointment of
members to the Board contemplated by section 31 of the Mental
Health Act. Provided that the specific requirements of section 547
respecting membership, quorum and procedures are followed,
8 5
there is no reason not to conclude that indeed it is the "federal
board" which is acting, notwithstanding the beliefs of the Chairman
or parties to a hearing. As long as the requirements of section 547
are followed, this panel is a federal board when it reviews any
detention resulting from an order under section 545 or 546(1) or (2)
of the Criminal Code. On the other hand, if the Board so acting is
improperly constituted according to the Code, or does not first act
within six months various remedies may be sought in the Federal
Court: a declaration against the Lieutenant Governor declaring that
he should appoint a Board in the latter case; or a mandatory
injunction against the Board in the former case, requiring it to act.
In all cases, review jurisdiction would be exclusively vested in the
Federal Court, whenever powers delegated by section 547 are being
exercised.
It follows from the above discussion, therefore, that the
respective dates of creation of federal and provincial boards is not
relevant to the issue of whether a "federal board" commission or
other tribunal" has been created. One may conclude, insofar as the
85. There are several differences in the requirements of the Criminal Code and the
Mental Health Act. (i) The former enactment requires a board of 3 to 5 members of
which 2 shall be qualified psychiatrists and I a qualified barrister; the latter requires
a board comprised of a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court, a psychiatrist
and at least three other members. (ii) The Code requires a quorum of three
including at least one psychiatrist and one lawyer; the Act requires a quorum of
five, including a psychiatrist and the judge. (iii) The Code permits any member to
serve as Chairman; the Act requires the judge to so serve. (iv) The Code requires a
first hearing within six months of detention; the Act permits a hearing as late as 2
years less one day from the date of detention. (v) The Code stipulates the
Chairman's powers by reference to the Federal Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-13:
the Act incorporates the procedures of section 29 of the Mental Health Act.
Nevertheless, there is no direct inconsistency in these provisions and there is no
reason why exactly the same individuals performing exactly the same tasks cannot
serve on both boards at once.
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provincial exception of the section 2(g) definition is concerned, that
Federal Court judicial review jurisdiction will be ousted only when
the recipient of a federal statutory power is appointed by or under a
law of a province, and not by or under the provincial prerogative or
some other provincially oriented source. Moreover, even in cases
where federal powers are delegated to a named board or official
constituted by or under a provincial statute, recourse must be had to
the concept of persona designata in order to determine if, in fact,
these federal powers are being delegated to the provincial appointee
qua provincial appointee. Finally, in cases of inter-delegation to
boards or commissions, it is necessary to compare carefully the
provisions of the federal or provincial statutes with respect to
membership, procedures and quorum. Differences between the two
statutes are evidence that indeed a separate federal board is being
created.
IV. Conclusion
It is almost impossible to pick up a volume of any Canadian series
of law reports and not find at least one judgment in which the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court is (or should be) in issue. The
precise scope of the judicial review jurisdiction of the Court is of
particular difficulty. As a result of the Quebec North Shore Paper
case potential constitutional problems abound. But more impor-
tantly, the language of section 2(g) of the Federal Court Act is
simply inappropriate as a definition of the types of powers and
categories of decision-makers who should be open to supervision by
the Court. Both the principal clause which states the foundation of
this jurisdiction and the exception clauses which exclude federal
review in certain cases are elliptical and ambiguous. The expression
"any body or any person or persons having, exercising or
purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under
an Act of the Parliament of Canada. . ." is elliptical, as it does not
include a number of decision-makers who exercise federally
authorized administrative law powers. The exception clause "other
than . . . any such person or persons appointed under section 96 of
the British North America Act, 1867" is ambiguous, as it does not
provide guidance in determining the scope of the doctrine of
persona designata as applied to the judiciary. Finally, the exception
clause "other than any such body constituted or established by or
under a law of a province or any such person or persons appointed
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under or in accordance with a law of a province" is both elliptical
and ambiguous.
This last clause is elliptical in that it does not extend the exception
to provincial officials not appointed by an Act of a legislature:
Lieutenant-Governors, persons appointed under provincial Royal
Prerogative, and several other provincial decision-makers may thus
be subject to Federal Court review in many cases. The clause is also
ambiguous because it neither sets out criteria for determining the
scope of the persona designata concept with respect to provincially
appointed officials, nor does it elaborate, in cases of federal
inter-delegation to a board or commission, factors to be considered
in evaluating when a body has been constituted or established under
a law of a province. Cases such as Vardy v. Scott8" and Re Abel and
Penetang Mental Health Centre87 are examples of the confusion
which this last exception clause has created.
In view of the inevitable problems which arise whenever a system
of dual jurisdictions is created some have recommended the
abolition of the Federal Court judicial review power."" Yet there is
nothing inherently intractable about defining the circumstances in
which recourse should be sought before the Federal Court. Minor
amendments to both the inclusive and exclusive clauses of section
2(g) will overcome most of the problems here raised. In the interim
one cannot be overly critical of provincial Superior Courts which
refuse to decline jurisdiction on the basis that review should have
been sought in the Federal Court. Nevertheless, especially in cases
involving federal inter-delegation, counsel must be prepared to
carefully examine the provisions of the federal statute which grants
such power in order to determine if indeed a separate federal
tribunal is envisioned.
86. (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 431 (S.C.C.)
87. (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 279 (Div. Ct.)
88. Compare Mullan, The Federal Court Act (1977), at 74, and the comments of
Professor Evans referred to therein.
